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Cards and cash are competing payment instruments at point-of-sale. The two-
sided market platform theory, based on general benefit assumptions, supports the 
use of multilateral interchange fees for card payments as a means of promoting 
the use of cards. However, analysis of the issue from the concrete processing cost 
viewpoint leads to the opposite conclusion: collection of debit card interchange 
fees by issuers results in subsidisation of cash and so actually promotes the use of 
cash instead of cards. Banks use card interchange revenues to cover cash 
distribution costs. For merchants, interchange fees increase payment costs and 
thus reduce the possibilities to pass through to customers the cost savings flowing 
from card efficiency. Moreover, because of high merchant fees due to high 
interchange fees, merchants are also more reluctant to accept payment cards. An 
MIF based on the tourist level approach will result in all parties being indifferent 
between cash and cards and thereby delay the realisation of the cost benefits of 
increased debit card usage. The resent actions of authorities to increase 
transparency and reduce cross-subsidisation seem to point in the right direction - 
towards more efficient resource allocation in payments. 
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Pankkikorttien siirtohinnat johtavat usein käteisen 
käyttöä tukevaan ristisubventioon 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 3/2011 
Harry Leinonen 




Käteinen ja kortit ovat ostostilanteessa kilpailevia maksuvälineitä. Kaksipuolisten 
markkina-alustojen teoria, joka perustuu yleisiin hyötyoletuksiin, tukee monen-
keskisten siirtohintojen valitsemista korttien käytön edistämiseksi. Kuitenkin 
analyysi, joka perustuu konkreettisiin prosessointikustannuksiin, päätyy vastak-
kaiseen lopputulokseen: siirtohinnan asettaminen pankkikorttitapahtumille johtaa 
käteisen subventoimiseen ja sitä kautta käteisen – ei korttien – käytön edistämi-
seen. Pankit käyttävät korttien siirtohintatuottoja käteisen jakelukustannuksien 
kattamiseen. Kauppiaille siirtohinnat merkitsevät korotusta maksamisen kustan-
nuksiin ja vähentävät siten kauppiaiden mahdollisuuksia siirtää korttien käytöstä 
syntyviä kustannussäästöjä asiakkailleen. Tämän lisäksi siirtohinnat lisäävät kaup-
piaiden korttitapahtumaveloituksia, mikä vähentää heidän kiinnostustaan hyväk-
syä korttimaksuja. Siirtohinta, joka perustuu ns. turistitasoon, johtaa kaikkien osa-
puolten välinpitämättömyyteen kortti- ja käteismaksun välillä ja viivyttää tätä 
kautta pankkikorttien käytön yleistymisestä saavutettavia hyötyjä. 
 
Avainsanat: siirtohinnoittelu, ristisubventiot maksuissa 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G14, G38, L14, L42, L51  
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1  Introduction  
Consumers have to pay for purchases and merchants can accept different kinds of payment 
instruments. Merchants have an interest in finding a mutually suitable instrument because 
otherwise the purchase will not be made. The main task of any instrument is to transfer 
funds from payer to payee, but one instrument may be more suitable or efficient than 
another in a given situation. However, the payment instruments in use share an existing 
payment market volume; for instance, when card volumes increase the volumes of other 
instruments – most importantly cash – will decrease. The instrument selection and palette 
will not affect the total volume of payments made, which is determined by the budget 
constraints for consumption.  
There is a variety of card products that can be used at point of sale instead of cash or 
cheque payments. These are generally categorised as debit cards or as one of two types of 
credit cards: charge cards and revolving credit cards. Today, debit cards are dominant in 
most national card payment markets.
1
       In most cases, the accounts of the payer and payee are with different service providers 
and the interbank (service-provider) cooperation makes it possible to transfer funds 
between different service providers. In the card system context, the payer's bank is called 
the "issuer" of the payment instrument and the payee's bank is the "acquirer". Account-
based payments, eg card payments, are processed according to a four corner  model as 
shown in figure 1. The issuing side in this framework comprises the payer and the issuer, 
the acquiring side the payee and the acquirer. The payers and payees select the payment 
instrument to be used, cash or card. In the card system context, the payer is called the 
"cardholder" and the shop/store accepting the card payment the "merchant". The issuer and 
acquirer negotiate on  the interchange fee for card-based  interbank  (service-provider) 
payments, which can be positive (paid by acquirer to issuer), zero, or negative (paid by 
issuer to acquirer). A non-zero interchange fee does not affect the total processing costs but 
merely reallocates them among the service providers. As consumers/cardholders will pay 
all the charges/costs in the end (as card fees or card costs internalised in merchant prices), 
the interchange fees affect the side levying the consumer charges and the level of charges 
only when cross-subsidisation and widening of the profit margin distort the effects.   
 The card technology as such is also used to enhance 
cash distribution via ATMs in order to replace over-the-counter cash withdrawals. The 
same card can be used at an ATM or at a point of sale. The card is basically a means of 
ensuring a customer’s title to a money balance on an account in a more efficient and secure 
manner than of the alternatives, for example pass-books or cheques. 
      In contrast to card payments,  cash carries no interbank interchange fee, although 
modern cash circulation generally adheres to the four corner model: in order to make a cash 
payment, the consumer/cardholder withdraws cash in advance from the banks/ATMs and 
the merchant deposits total daily cash receipts into bank accounts (seldom nowadays do 
they  pay invoices or salaries with  cash but instead use  credit transfers or other bank 
account-based instruments).    
 
                                                 
1 See card payment statistics in BIS/CPSS Red Book and ECB/Blue Book                                                            
 
















Cash or card?  
Figure 1: The four corner model of card or cash payments 
The main issues here seems to be 
1.    From the overall economic and competition viewpoint, what is the "optimal" 
level of card interchange fee? 
2.    What is the "optimal" mix of cash and card payments?  
3.     How does the non-transparency of costs affect instrument choices and 
interchange issues? 
4.    Are authority interventions necessary; if so, what tools should be used? 
 
In the two-sided market platform literature, card payments have been seen as  a more 
beneficial instrument than cash payments, and interchange fees are considered necessary 
for reallocating costs so as to promote efficient card usage (see eg Evans&Schmalensee, 
2005). According to payment cost studies done by central banks, cash is generally efficient 
only for mini-size (coin-sized) purchases.
2
The international card schemes (eg Visa and Mastercard) and some domestic ones use 
interchange fees for card payments that are paid by the acquirer to the issuer, which results 
in acquirers adding the interchange fees to their acquiring fees (merchant fees).
    
3
                                                 
2 See eg Banco de Portugal (2007) ‘Retail Payment Instruments in Portugal: Costs and Benefits’, July, Banco 
de Portugal, Lisbon pp 1-121 ; Bergman,Guiborg&Segendorf (2007) ‘The Costs for Paying — Private and 
Social Costs of Cash and Cards’, Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 212 pp 1-37 , September; 
Brits&Winder(2005) ‘Payments Are No Free Lunch’, De Nederlandsche Bank, Occasional Studies, Vol. 3, 
No. 2, pp 1 - 44; Gresvik&Haare(2009) ‘Costs in the Norwegian Payment System’, Staff Memo No. 4, 
Norges Bank, Oslo pp 1-103; and National Bank of Belgium (2006) ‘Cost, Advantages and Drawbacks of the 
Various Means of Payment’, Economic Review, 2Q pp 1-8. 
   
Authorities have taken an increasing interest in the determination of and reasoning behind 
interchange fees. Multilateral interchange fees (MIFs) in particular are set jointly by the 
issuers, which can be viewed as  a  system of cartel-type anti-competitive agreements.  
Several authorities have recently taken actions to reduce the level of interchange fees, eg 
Australia, the EU and (in the pipeline) the United States
 (for details, see section 5).  During 
3 See Weiner and Wright (2005) and Bradford (2008) for interchange schemes in different countries.                                                              
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the  underlying discussions, the card-systems  and issuers  have presented a variety of 
arguments in defence of interchange fees and authorities have argued for lower fees.  
This article aims to 
- show that debit card interchange fees paid by acquirers to issuers do not support card 
usage, but have in fact the opposite effect by subsidising cash and thereby 
promoting  the excessive  use of cash.  In the current market setup, debit card 
interchange fees are used to transfer card benefit surpluses from the acquiring 
side to the issuing side, where these mainly result in cross-subsidies to cover 
cash withdrawal costs or increase issuer profits. 
- point out that  the  lack of transparency of cost factors results  in biased payment 
volumes: too little use of debit cards and excessive use of cash and credit cards, 
as  compared to efficient customer choice under transparent and competitive 
pricing structures 
- assess different authority interchange  interventions and their possible effects on 
payment instrument efficiency. 
      The main finding of the article is that the card market and interchange fee analysis 
needs to be expanded from the limited credit card company approach of the two-sided 
market platform model to a more general model in which banks provide, in parallel, both 
cash and card payment services relying on card technology. In this expanded perspective, 
the cost efficiency of alternative instruments becomes the determining factor. From the 
consumer and social viewpoints, the embedded and non-transparent pricing used in the 
two-sided market platform leads to a sub-optimal solution due to its limited scope. In 
particular, setting the interchange fee close to the "tourist test level" would result in almost 
total elimination of the development incentive. This paper concludes that maintaining a 
zero interchange fee and increasing the cost transparency would promote both competition 
and efficiency in retail payments, as compared to a situation with high positive interchange 
fees.      
  The  structure of this article  is  as follows.  First,  the two-sided market platform is 
presented, followed by the cash subsidisation effects. Thirdly, the diverging results of the 
two  models  (lines  of thought)  are compared.  Fourthly, different authority decisions on 
MIFs are compared, The paper ends with concluding remarks on the potential benefits of 
increased competition in payment services. An appendix provides  a comparison of debit 
and credit card cost and pricing structures.   
2  The two-sided market platform theory of interchange fees    
 
The two-sided market platform theory for card payments has become the main academic 
rationale for MIFs. The earliest general reference is William Baxter’s paper (1983). Since 
then,  Jean-Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole,  (eg 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007  and 2008)  David 
Evans, Richard Schmalensee (eg 1995 and 2005) and Julian Wright (eg 2003, 2004a and 
2004b) have published several articles on the topic. 
The process setup in the two-sided card market theory is the so-called four corner 
model  including  issuer, acquirer, cardholder and merchant (see figure 1).  There is an 
interchange fee paid by  the acquirer to the issuer, which is included in the acquirer’s 
merchant fee. The interchange fee transfers the merchant’s benefits to the issuer so as to                                                            
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reduce issuers’ charges to cardholders. The merchants internalise the card costs, including 
MIFs, in their prices of goods and services, ie merchants do not transparently surcharge the 
MIF, as that would merely shift the card fee charging from issuer to merchant and thus 
eliminate  the benefits of "two-sidedness"  (see eg Rochet&Tirole 2004  and 
Frankel&Shampine 2006).  The basic assumption of the two-sided card theory is that 
cardholders  and society gain a benefit through more efficient payment processes when 
merchants pay the MIF. 
 
The card, the payment services and additional services  such as  credits are seen as a 
common platform service, which is intended to attract both cardholders and merchants.  
Cash (and/or cheques) are seen as the benchmark compared to which the card services must 
be more attractive. According to this theory cards provide benefits (B) to cardholders and 
merchants, but they pay charges/costs (C) for the service. Using the notation
4
 
 of David 
Evans and Richard Schmalensee  (Evans&Schmalensee, 2005),  we write  that  cards are 
efficient instruments when benefits exceed service provision costs: 
(1)                                 ( B
c + B




However, in order to attract both sides of the market  (superscript c=cardholder and 
m=merchant), both need to experience a net benefit: 
 
(2)                        (B
c –  C
c ) ≥ 0  and  (B
m – C
m ) ≥ 0 
 
The first condition is met in situations where cards are generally more efficient instruments 
than cash (cheques). However, if cardholders’ costs would exceed their benefits, consumers 
would refrain from using cards and a potential social benefit would be lost. According to 
the two-sided market platform theory, an MIF could be introduced to transfer benefits from 
the merchant side to the cardholder side, in order to balance the benefits and meet the 
specific-benefit requirements of both sides.  The balancing MIF would flow from the 
acquiring side to the issuing side, when the benefit shortage is on the issuing side, which 
seems to be the basic assumption of the academic articles.  
 
(3)                        (B
c –  C
c +MIF) ≥ 0  and  (B
m – C
m  – MIF) ≥ 0      
 
MIFs are usually set jointly by the service providers, by the issuers alone, or by issuers and 
acquirers. Because service providers cooperate in price setting, authorities have sometimes 
stepped in to determine “reasonable” MIF levels. The academic articles contain quite 
different views on how MIFs should be set, on what the optimal MIF could be, on what 
kind of method should be used for calculations, and even as to whether there exists an 
optimal MIF. 
 
 In his original article Baxter (1983, pp 585–586) found that interchange fees are both 
appropriate and desirable and that the authorities should let the markets determine the 
                                                 
4 Note that these equations are kept general and simple in order to illustrate the basic setup. The complexity 
increases rapidly for example when marginal costs, fixed costs and different kinds of charging structures and 
non-linear utility functions or different kinds of market imperfections are included.                                                              
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equilibrating levels. He also predicted that debit and credit cards would carry different 
interchange fees, because of different ways of allocating charges.   
Schmalensee (2002, pp 118–119) concluded that one need not criticise banks for collective 
determination of interchange fees and that interchange fees are determined by demand 
differences between issuers and acquirers. According to his analysis, the private value-
maximising  fee  may be higher or lower than the output-optimizing fee. The welfare-
maximizing fee is found to differ from the output-maximizing fee in the same direction as 
the profit-maximizing fee. In a later study  Evans and Schmalensee  (2005, pp 37–38) 
conclude that socially optimal prices in multi-sided industries depend on several factors 
such as price elasticities, indirect network effects, and marginal costs. These affect the 
socially optimal interchange fee, as do other factors such as shares of fixed and variable 
fees as well as competition among merchants, issuers, and acquirers and among alternative 
instruments such as cash and cheques. It will therefore be different from an interchange fee 
based solely on cost factors. They also find that theory alone does not allow us to say 
whether interchange fees would be higher, lower or equal to the socially optimal fee.    
 Rochet & Tirole (2007, p 28) find that an interchange fee set by issuers would probably 
exceed the short-term social optimum under certain circumstances: absence of platform 
competition, cardholder single-homing and merchant homogeneity, or if the fraction of 
cardholder benefits internalized by merchants exceeds the issuers’ per-transaction markup. 
They also conclude that under platform competition and multi-homing, the market-based 
interchange fee is lower than the value that maximizes consumer surplus and social 
welfare.  
In another article (2007)  they propose the  “Tourist Test” model
5
 
  for determining the 
maximum MIF; it should not be so high as to render merchants indifferent between card 
and cash payments, that is 
(4)                   (B
c –  C
c +MIF
m0b) ≥ 0  and  (B
m – C
m  –MIF
m0b) = 0      
 
The interchange according to the maximum Tourist Test (MIF
m0b) would transfer all net-
benefits from the acquiring/merchant side to the issuing/cardholder side. It can therefore 
also be labelled the MIF resulting in merchant zero-level benefits, ie MIF
m0b, which will be 
notation used in the rest of this article.  
 
In line with the merchants' zero-level MIF (Tourist Test), another interesting MIF level can 
be generated from this equation, which could be called the cardholder's zero-benefit level 
(MIF
c0b), that is 
 
          (5)                   (B
c –  C
c +MIF
c0b) = 0  and  (B
m – C
m  – MIF
c0b) ≥ 0    
 
At the cardholder's zero-benefit  level,  the issuer will cover its  costs via the MIF and 
cardholder fees/costs to such an extent that card holders will be indifferent between cash 
and cards. At this MIF level, the net benefits remain with the acquiring side.  If the MIF is 
                                                 
5  Rochet & Tirole (2007) p 7 “Definition: The merchant discount ps passes the tourist test if and only if 
accepting the card does not increase the retailer’s net operating cost”. In equation (4) the sum of terms C
m and 
MIF
m0b equals the merchant discount, and merchant costs would increase when merchants’ card benefits do 
not cover merchants’ card costs.                                                            
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lower than the zero-benefit MIF, cardholders will find cash to be a more attractive option. 
Note that in a very general setup this could also result in a negative MIF, so that the issuing 
side would transfer benefits to the acquiring side. 
     From  this,  it  follows  that the socially optimal interchange fee (MIF
opt)  lies  at or 
somewhere in between these extremes:   
 
       (6)                   MIF




In theory it would suffice in a "homogenous" environment if both sides were to receive 
some small part of the benefits in order to “get everyone aboard". In a very general model 
the merchants and cardholders would be quite homogeneous  groups of agents. The 
cardholders would use their entire budgets and select the more efficient instrument to pay 
for their consumption. For the cardholder it is  an either-or decision, because the 
consumption volume is given and the basic issue is that of selecting one or the other 
instrument. Therefore we do not have the same type of elasticity relationship between price 
level and volumes as in standard pricing models. Both merchants and cardholders would 
decide to make/accept card payments when the MIF is between the zero-benefit extremes. 
The theoretical contributions do not indicate clearly which parameters would be required 
for establishing the MIF
opt  or how market data should be collected for estimating  the 
parameters. This will be more difficult in practice, as neither cardholders nor merchants 
comprise a homogeneous  group of agents with identical benefit and cost structures.
6
      
 
Moreover, the parameter values, eg due to developments in costs, charges, convenience etc, 
would probably vary over time, which would imply varying MIF
opt values. There has been 
very little empirical research on the optimal level of benefit sharing between merchant and 
card holder. ‘For this reason, the currently applied MIFs are usually simply the actual 
interchange fees (MIF
act), which are set jointly by the issuers, provided the authorities have 
not set ceilings on them. Finding the optimal MIF can also be approached from another 
perspective, based on increased transparency, as discussed in section 3. 
According to the two-sided platform model,  the  issuing/cardholders' side  and 
acquiring/merchants' side will share the net benefits such that the issuing side receives the 
share s and the merchants 1–s  (where s can vary from 0 to 1 and 0 implies the use of 
MIF




      (7)           Issuing side net benefit = s
 (( B
c + B
m ) – ( C
c + C
m ))  
 






                                                 
6 In a heterogeneous environment the MIF
m0b and MIF
c0b points would vary for individual cardholders and 
merchants. The optimal value would then have a narrower range of variation. There could also be cross-over 
points between heterogeneous merchants and cardholders, that is MIF
m0b  < MIF
c0b  indicating some 
combinations of individual cardholders and merchants would find cash to be preferable in all situations, while 
still other combinations  would find cards preferable. In this kind of situation, the optimality will depend on 
the actual shape of the zero-benefit border-line distribution among individual cardholders and merchants. 
Symmetric distributions would result in the average becoming optimal. The differences in skewness would 
with non-symmetric distributions determine the shift away from the average value.                                                               
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The issuing side’s returns can be split into following components: the actual interchange 
fee received
7, MIF
act, cardholders' rebates, card processing costs C
c and issuers' profits 
(∏
i). From the received MIF
act the issuer deducts the costs
8 and profits (equation 8) in a 
non-transparent way. The remainder will be any transparent rebates (R) to the cardholders. 
This has raised a debate as to what part of the benefits the issuers keep in order to increase 
their profits by reducing the potential rebates to cardholders. This would reduce the net 









which can be written as 
 
      (9)        MIF




      If there is sufficient issuance competition in the market, the profit term  ∏
i
 should be 
zero or close to zero. If cardholders are not explicitly rebated by anything other than extra 
services and charge reductions included in issuers' costs (that is, zero issuer rebates), then 
the above equation reduces to 
 




      This seems to be the reasoning behind some authorities’ policy of capping interchange 
fees at the level of issuance costs in the absence of explicit cardholder rebates. Issuers 
should not be able, according to the legislation principles of competition, to cooperate in 
price setting so as to increase their  profits.  In theory,  competition among merchants, 
acquirers and issuers will result in the full pass-through of benefits/costs to cardholders, but 
authority inventions are needed when market barriers limit competition.   
   There are very few empirical studies on payment system costs and benefits that help to 
determine the optimal interchange fee (MIF
opt) and assess how far from optimality the 
applied actual interchange levels (MIF
act) are. Garcia–Swartz et al  (2006)  presented 
calculations based largely on the Food Marketing Institute studies of 1998 and 2000. Some 
central banks in Europe
10
                                                 
7 Superscript MIF
act is used to indicate that the employed and actual interchange fee can differ from any 
optimal fee, because it seems clearly difficult to determine what would be an optimal fee and in case of non-
conflicting zero-benefit points, there would be range of MIFs acceptable to all stakeholders.. 
 and the Reserve Bank of Australia (see section 5) have made 
payment cost assessments. Of these, only the Australian studies were intended to be used to 
support the fixing of interchange fees. The academic contributions all seem to be purely 
theoretical in the sense that they do not use actual figures or even provide exact calculation 
methods for interchange fees.  
8 These equations are based on the simple assumption that all issuer costs are covered by the MIF revenues 
alone. If issuers are also covering some costs via explicit card charges these can be included in the equation as 
net deductions of the issuers card costs or as gross revenues as a new factor. However, the basic competition 
legislation will remain the same, issuers should not cooperate on MIFs in order to increase their profits. 
9 In this context, rebates are separated from other card production costs of issuers, as these can be seen as 
transfers or additional services benefiting the card holder directly. The alternative would be to keep them as a 
part of issuing costs. The profit factor will remain the same irrespective of any separation of the rebate factor. 
10 See footnote 2                                                            
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       According to Rochet  (2007, p13),  "the regulation of interchange fees is a very 
hazardous exercise, since socially optimal interchange fees depend in a complex fashion on 
parameters that are extremely difficult to estimate empirically". Data collection is difficult 
because  one immediately runs into problems  regarding  costs,  eg in  allocating costs to 
product lines. Adding to the difficulty: a lack of payment instrument-level cost accounting 
at banks, processing centres, merchants and consumers; difficulty in measuring various 
benefits in monetary units and in comparing products associated with different service 
levels and different services (eg credits); and difficulty in calculating averages and using 
them where there are huge institutional differences, which also change over time. Because 
of the hazards involved, it would be necessary to find a means of reducing the likelihood 
that actual MIFs will diverge widely from optimal MIFs. Currently actual interchange fees 
are set by self-regulatory bodies of the industry without the aid of (at least published) 
studies on the parameters used in actual interchange fee setting or relating to the above-
described  academic models. Self-regulation will probably entail  service-provider bias, 
which could result in an MIF differing from the social optimum due to industry interests. 
       However, when authorities apply a cost-based cap on the MIF, they are in fact limiting 
the extra profits of issuers. They require that the profit factor in equation 9 is non-positive 
when the actual MIF is set by the market: 
 
      (11)        MIF
act ≤  R + C
c 
  
     In this setup the issuers are allowed to freely set the MIF, provided the aim is merely to 
cover the direct card processing costs and rebates. Any surplus over costs should be rebated 
to cardholders.  
      
3  A cost-based approach to interchange fee subsidisation effects 
   In the two-sided market platform model, merchants are seen as the other side of the 
market, which covers the costs of the acquiring side, including those of the interchange. 
However, as with all merchant costs, the ultimate payers are the merchants' customers, via 
internalised markups on products and services. In the cost-based approach presented below, 
the total costs/charges ultimately paid by consumers/cardholders comprise the basis for 
efficiency analysis of payment instruments. There are cross-subsidisation effects due to 
"package pricing" on the issuing side and the average pricing convention (ie the zero 
surcharge/rebate  policy) on the acquiring side. One might  even question whether  the 
payment service market is a truly two-sided, given that in the end there is only one paying 
customer in a single payment transaction. The consumer costs are embedded in a way 
which makes it difficult for consumers to make rational choices based on cost differences. 
The cross-subsidisation effects of MIFs have been analysed among others by Allan Frankel 
and  Allan Shampine (2006), Adam Levitin (2008),  Steven Semeraro (2009)  and Scott 
Schuh, Oz Shy and Joanna Stavins (2010).  Common to these studies is the focus on cross-
subsidising by the merchants. Cross-subsidising on the issuing side between cash and cards 
seem to be a very rare research topic.                                                            
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3.1  Cash cross-subsidies on the Issuing side 
 
Banks provide customers with current accounts to which consumer salaries are paid 
(receiving salaries in cash or paycheques is becoming the exception). Customers spend by 
drawing on their accounts. Banks issue cards in order to make account  withdrawals 
efficient, which can be done in two ways: a) drawing cash from an ATM to use it later in 




























Figure 2: The two models for use of debit cards 
When the issued cards are used in ATMs, the issuers will pay an ATM charge
11 (called 
ASF in this paper)  to the ATM network,  which  is typically about  0.2–0.8% of the 
withdrawn amount.
12
                                                 
11  This kind of ATM service charge is  in some analysis called ATM interchange fees, but this kind of 
terminology hides the basic differences between these factors. Provision of ATM services is an outsourcing 
activity, where the ATM-owner is providing withdrawal services directly to the issuer  and the issuer's 
customer. There is only one alternative for covering the costs and only one customer involved. An ATM 
service is a one-sided market, with transparent or non-transparent customer charges. In the case of the 
EFTPOS MIF it is a case of transferring costs between two different customers involved and their service 
providers. An EFTPOS MIF different from zero will transfer funds from one of the customers to the other (in 
the first round of charging).   
 When the same cards are used directly in shops, the issuers receive 
interchange fees from the acquirers, which, in the EU, would be no more than 0.2% for a 
debit card, based on the new DG Competition agreement between Visa and Mastercard 
(EU Commission 2007b and 2009 and Schwimann 2009). Card customers typically pay a 
fixed periodic fee for the card, irrespective of the amount and type of usage. Although 
some banks charge extra for the use of “foreign” ATMs, customers usually are not charged 
separately for most of their ATM withdrawals and very seldom for card payments in shops. 
Sometimes banks segment their card services by providing low-charge or free ATM-only 
cards and pricing separately dual functioning POS+ATM-cards. In addition to the possible 
12 The pricing models seem to vary considerably among networks and over time and include both flat and 
value-based parts as well as fixed participant and/or start up fees. However, most of the interbank charges and 
internal costs are  non-public, and their ranges are based on the available figures from Finland, Norway, 
Portugal and Sweden. For details, see Takala& Virén (2008), Gresvik&Haare (2009), Banco de Portugal 
(2007) and Bergman, Guibourg&Segendorf (2007)                                                            
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card fee, issuers receive a seignorage-type of revenue based on the interest level difference 
between the rate on a current account and the average for reinvestment of deposited funds. 
The issuers’ processing costs are the same in both alternatives, because the very same card 
can be used employing the same card system, and the transactions are booked on the same 
account using the same account system facilities. Even the transactions presented by the 
ATM network switch and the acquirer/card network follow the identical transaction routes 
and standards (usually the ISO 8583 format). The processing costs in the issuers’ systems 
for these two card transaction are therefore practically  the same.
13
It  follows  that the interchange fee and current card customer charging model  cross-
subsidise
  The difference in 
issuers’ costs depends on the MIF and ATM network charges.  
14
 
  cash withdrawals, when the service provision difference between cash 
withdrawals and card purchases are non-transparent to customers, that is cash services are 
not explicitly priced.  The individual  customers cannot detect  the  issuers’  actual  cost 
difference between these alternatives. This will, as in all cases of subsidisation, promote 
the use of the subsidised service. The higher the MIF, the larger the cross-subsidy for cash. 
As banks’ cost accounting is non-transparent, it cannot be assessed as to the extent to 
which interchange revenues cover actual service costs and to which they boost issuers’ total 
profits.  The situation can  be described as follows, where  ∏
i  stands for issuer’s  profit 
margin and ASF for the ATM service fee, and v is the share of POS transactions in total 
volume, that is the sum of POS and ATM transactions: 
(12)               ∏
i   = C
c 
 + (MIF*v) – (ASF*(1–v) )   
 
Banks have card and account service costs C
c, independent of how the withdrawal volumes 
are distributed between POS and ATM transactions as the cardholder can use the same card 
in two different ways. The only variable cost factor is the ATM charge, ASF and the only 
variable revenue factor is the EFTPOS MIF. We can therefore use the same factor C
c for 
the fixed card costs associated both with card payments and ATM withdrawals, which is 
the central finding of the cost-based approach. This means that when cardholders increase 
their POS usage and correspondingly reduce their ATM usage (or over-the-counter cash 
withdrawals, which are even more costly to provide than ATM withdrawals). A marginal 
increase in v will increase banks' profits by MIF + ASF, as additional POS transactions 
result in a corresponding decrease in ATM transactions in value terms.
15
                                                 
13 If banks segment their products, by issuing different cards for ATM-only and POS-only usage. this will 
increase their card costs.  A common network of ATMs decreases the costs of ATM services and increases 
the service accessibility of customers compared to having every issuer/bank operate its own national or 
worldwide ATM network. However, from the issuers point of view the additional costs are compensated by 
higher total net revenues facilitated by segmentation 
  Based on the 
figures from figure 2 the gain from a change from ATM to POS would result in a profit 
14 This is the lowest common level of subsidisation as the common card is used for two different bank 
services; point-of-sale purchases and cash withdrawals, which are priced with different margins. However, 
there can also exist cross-subsidising higher in the product hierarchy for example the combined margin of 
these products as a product/service group level can be subsidised by other banking services or when highly 
profitable provide cross-subsidisation potential to other services.   
15 This simple outcome is true when the MIF and ASF are both strictly value-based. The relationship to 
profits becomes more complex when one or both of these have flat or other-type components, in which means  
that the average transaction values of POS and ATM transactions affect the outcome.                                                            
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improvement of 0.4-1.1%, when  nothing is reimbursed to customers. The total MIF 
revenue of issuers increases while the ATM network costs decrease. 
Issuers often say that they reimburse card customers by having lower periodic card fees or 
react on authorities' proposed MIF cuts by stating that the result will be higher card fees for 
cardholders, which supports the observation of cash cross-subsidisation. The card costs and 
fees relate both to ATM and EFTPOS usage, as the card will be the very same in an 
efficient setup. However, this is a very complex case of cross-subsidisation. Banks very 
seldom charge separately for over the counter cash withdrawals, so these have been cross-
subsidised from the low interest margins on current accounts. When bank cards and ATM 
withdrawals are introduced, the withdrawal costs decrease and therefore also the need for 
cross-subsidisation. When bank cards can be used directly at shops, the ATM withdrawal 
cost will be lower and the cross-subsidisation out of interest margins can be reduced in 
accord with the difference between ATM and EFTPOS costs.  
It should also be noted that the described subsidisation effect depends on the size of the 
purchase transaction. Basically variable EFTPOS transaction costs are very marginal and 
are independent of transaction size, that is the processing costs for a transaction of EUR 1 
are the same as those for a transaction of EUR 1 000. However, the costs for cash payments 
vary with the size of the payment, due to the manual and physical logistics. When one 
ATM withdrawal can be used to cover several smaller POS card payments, the issuer costs 
of one ATM withdrawal should be compared the internal booking costs of several POS 
purchases. There is therefore a break-even point in transaction size below  which POS 
purchases become more costly than ATM withdrawals. This point depends  on the 
compared ATM withdrawal  and purchase sizes and the production cost structure, cost 
levels and horizon of analysis, in determining the extent to which the cost elements are 
variable, semi-variable or completely fixed. This break-even point is the lower, the larger 
the market share of card purchases, as the economies of scale effect would shift in favour 
of POS usage. The available cost studies are not sufficiently detailed to provide a clear 
break-even point from issuers viewpoint, but a cautious approximation of EUR 5–10 can 
be made based on the cost levels of  2003-2005, which means that the current 
approximation would be lower, due to general cost developments (relatively lower ICT and 
higher manual costs over time) and rapidly growing debit card volumes in relation to cash 
withdrawal volumes.
16
This finding might support the convention of a minimum card purchase size, which obtains 
in some countries (seem still to be the case in UK and have been applied in Finland based 
on a joint bank decision  before the Competition Authority deemed it to be anti-
competitive) that the purchase size limit should be quite low for debit cards. However, the 
conclusion is not that straightforward, because when MIFs are used there would be some 
reason for diverting a part of the cash subsidy to the low-value card payment subsidy 
instead. An exact determination of the size limitation can therefore only be given case-by-
case, based on the actual elements in question.       
   
 
                                                 
16 See studies referred to in footnote 2.                                                            
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3.2  Cash cross-subsidies on the acquiring/merchant side 
 
We assume that there are sufficiently many competing acquirers in the market to reduce the 
possibility of acquirers extracting monopoly or oligopoly benefits. This enables us to focus 
on the MIF issue; an analysis of acquiring monopoly/oligopoly analysis would belong to 
the general analysis of markets with limited competition. However, it is worth noting that 
limited competition in card transaction acquiring is quite common within national card 
processing structures (European Commission 2006 and 2007a). 
In essence, acquirers include MIFs to be paid to the issuer in their merchant fees. They 
seldom affect the size of the MIF but do play an important role in enforcing non-surcharge 
rules on merchants. The results of the two-sided market model rely on merchant 
rebate/surcharge prohibitions. If the MIF effects were transparent to customers, the very 
basis of the two-sided card model would disappear as the cardholders would face the full 
bank charges, but just via two different routes.      
The basic assumption here and in the two-sided market model is that card processing costs 
on the acquiring side are lower than corresponding cash service costs, ie  the total of 
merchants’ internal card costs and card acquirers’ costs/charges are lower than merchants’ 
cash costs and merchants’ cash service providers’ cost/charges. This is consistent with the 
two-sided market model assumption of merchants’ net card benefits supporting a transfer 
of benefits via interchange fees. Moreover, it intuitively seems to be a robust assumption, 
because in the card alternative the merchant’s till system reads the card and the customer 
approves  the payment,  after which the transaction continues in a low cost electronic 
process. The time required to make a payment at the till is roughly the same for cash and 
debit  card  payments.
17  Costs of EFTPOS devices for cards have become marginal 
compared to the cash costs of proving and transporting cash, including the required security 
measures. Whereas  card acquirers can get by with a server application for electronic 
transaction clearing and settlement, cash operators need partly manual proving, sorting, 
fraud detecting and packing processes for physical cash, as well as transport systems. The 
logistics of physical cash are more costly  than the electronic forwarding of card 
transactions. These intuition-based views are supported by the findings of central bank cost 
studies.
18
When merchants, voluntarily or because of acquirer contracts, refrain from using rebates or 
surcharges to make payment cost differences transparent to customers, cross-subsidisation 
effects emerge, because the merchant will apply a general average payment markup on 
customer prices on goods and services, although there are different costs associated with 
the different instruments. Merchants need to cover their expenses and, when payment costs 
   
                                                 
17 The time studies made in Finland, Norway and Belgium provide findings according to which the time spent 
at point-of-sale for paying with cash and cards are closely the same, while debit card payments are somewhat 
slower in the Netherlands and Sweden. However, small, exact-sum payments are often faster with cash. The 
time necessary for debit card payments depends to some extent on several factors in the terminal setup eg 
stand alone versus integrated EFTPOS-terminal, magnetic stripe versus chip card reader, PIN versus signature 
verification, the speed of the receipt printer, general process design, customer familiarity with particular 
terminal etc.  This explains probably most of the differences between the national studies. The studies are part 
of the cost studies referred to in footnote 2.   
18 See studies referred to in footnote 2.                                                            
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are not differentiated, the remaining alternative is internalising via an average customer 
payment cost markup. The situation can be described by 
 
(13)       B
c = (B
m – C
m –MIF) * v 
 
The cardholders' benefits on the acquiring side depend on merchants’ net benefits, size of 
the MIF and the ratio of POS transactions to cash transactions. As the MIF increases, the 
benefits on the acquiring side decrease and disappear when the tourist test level is reached. 
The larger the share of POS transactions, the larger the benefits. The benefits will be shared 
among card and cash payers if there is no surcharging/rebating by the merchants. The 
merchant side benefits will be transferred in full to customers if there is sufficient price 
competition among merchants. This will result in subsidises to cash users. 
The subsidisation levels at the extremes (only cash 0 and only cards 1) will be negligible, 
because when all customers pay cash the merchant’s prices will only include embedded 
cash cost elements; the opposite is the case when they all use cards. Between the extremes, 
the card benefits increase with an increasing share of card customers, which reduces the 
merchants’ payment markups (figure 3). To the left in the figures are the merchant costs for 
card payments and to the right those for cash. The consumer price level line between the 
extremes (100% card or cash usage) is drawn on the assumption of mostly volume-based 
card acquiring and cash charges, to show the price level and markup effect of different 
mixes of cash and card payments. Customer benefits will increase at the merchants with 
increased card usage. Sufficient competition is assumed among merchants, ie the general 
tax and cost reductions/increases will be reflected in customer prices. The card benefits 































Figure 3: Price level and payment markups by merchants accepting                       
debit cards without MIF and cash 
    When the issuers agree on an MIF it will be included in the acquirers’ card charges to the 
merchants, because the acquirers are required to pay this fee to the issuers (or essentially it                                                            
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is withdrawn from the settlements of issuers). This increases the merchant card charges, as 
shown in figure 4 and thereby also the merchant markups and the consumer price-levels 
compared to a zero-MIF situation.  It will thereby reduce customers’ card  benefits at 
merchants. Issuers (banks) use the MIF to transfer the acquiring (merchant) side benefits of 
























Customer price level with 
average embedded markup










Figure 4: Price levels and payment markups at merchants accepting cards and cash, 
when issuers agree on a debit card MIF  
Based on figure 4, it follows that there can be three general levels of MIF. The one in the 
figure features a low MIF, and debit card payments at least to some extent provide benefits 
on the acquiring/merchant side. The MIF may instead be very high. so that debit card 
payments are more costly than cash payments, and cash payers are forced to subsidise card 
payers at merchants. Such a high MIF would in most cases reduce merchants’ incentive to 
accept cards. In the third alternative, the MIF raises card costs to the same level as for cash, 
the “tourist test level” (see Schwiman, 2009 and Rochet&Tirole, 2006).  
The general conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that without an MIF, the 
card benefits on the acquiring/merchant side will be shared by debit card and cash users, 
which implies an embedded cross-subsidy to cash payers. A MIF will move part or all of 
the benefit (depending on its size) from the acquiring/merchant side to the issuing side. It 
will thereby increase the cross-subsidisation of cash on the issuing side if issuers evenly 
disperse  MIF revenues among  cash withdrawals and debit  card purchases (see above 
section 3.1). The current market setup thereby provides cash with cross-subsidies also on 
the acquiring/merchant side, which promotes  cash purchases as opposed to direct card 
purchases and thereby reduces the efficiency level of payments.  
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4  Comparison of approaches 
4.1  The underlying differences 
 
Common to both approaches is the idea that cards are more efficient for a large share of 
current consumer payments at merchants. However, there are major differences in the two 
approaches (two-sided versus cost-based), which are summarized in table 1. 
 
  Two-sided approach  Cost-based approach 
Company/industry 
structure 
Credit card company provides 
only card payments;  cash 
services are provided (partly 
for free) externally 
Issuers provide account services 
(optionally with credit lines) and 
account withdrawals both via POS 
or ATM (debit cards and cash are 
competing services of the same 
service provider (bank) 
Instrument usage  Card employed only  for POS 
purchases from (credit) account 
Cards  employed as general 
account identification instruments 
and  the  same cards  are used  at 
ATMs and POS 
MIF effects  MIF  promotes  cash usage by  
reducing  issuers’ card charges 
compared to free  or  low-cost 
cash option 
MIF subsidises cash usage  and 
eliminates rebate  possibility  on 
acquiring side.  
Transparency  A no-surcharge  rule  is 
necessary to balance the MIF, 
ie discouraging surcharging on 
the acquiring side. 
Cost-based surcharging/rebating 
by instrument type would increase 
price transparency, competition 
and cost awareness.  
Service direction  The issuer provides a payment 
service via  acquirer to 
merchant. Merchants benefit by 
accepting cards; so they should 
help to cover issuers' costs. 
Merchants provide  a service to 
issuers when cards replace 
inefficient cash withdrawals and 
cheques. Merchants  automated 
also previous paper slips by 
investing in electronic EFTPOS 
terminals. Merchants provide 
services to issuers' customers. the 
cardholders.  
 
Table 1: Main underlying differences between the two approaches 
 
Using the simple notation employed earlier, the full benefit differences can be divided 
into following components: 
 






i + R + X                                                            
 
  22 
 
where R is rebates to cardholders (payments) and X is cross-subsidies to cash payers 
(payments). It is perhaps more correct to state that the subsidies and rebates go to payment 
transactions,  as most customers use cards and cash in parallel and depending on the 
payment situation the customer choice can be for the efficient or inefficient one. The larger 
the profit factor in equation 14, the smaller the customer benefit factor. The larger the X 
factor, the smaller the benefits to the benefit source, that is, card payments. The larger the 
visible cardholder rebate factor (R), the stronger the impact on cash replacement by cards.      
 
4.2  The risk of completely eliminating the incentive for development  
 
Based on the  cost differences shown in figure 2, banks should have the incentive to 
promote debit card usage over cash. However, the picture changes when banks provide 
both issuing and acquiring services for cash and cards. When both cash and card acquiring 
services are provided by banks, merchants generally use the same bank for acquiring cash 
and cards. Banks will thus move to a reasonable balance between card and cash acquiring 
in relation to the total acquiring business. Their market shares in issuing and acquiring will 
determine the balance of incoming and outgoing volumes vis-à-vis other banks.  
Considering first a well-balanced situation, the card payments are in balance (as much 
incoming as outgoing card purchases  for each bank);  and  as regards cash,  consumer 
withdrawals  equal deposits  by merchants.  In this well-balanced situation the MIF net 
revenues will be zero. Banks’ payment instrument profits will depend on their own issuing 
and acquiring fees minus production costs for cash and cards. Profits will thus depend on 
the margins on cash and cards. If the individual banks have priced their services according 
to costs, they will be indifferent to the choice of their customers. Because banks will have 
higher costs on the cash service side, they need to apply merchant fees that cover costs for 
both cash acquiring (merchant deposits) and cardholder withdrawals.  
This kind of situation could results  in “total development incentive removal. A  well-
balanced  revenue  situation removes banks’ interest in promoting a given instrument, 
because both are equally profitable and they merely share a given fixed volume determined 
by consumers' total consumption budgets. If the MIFs are set in respect of merchants at the 
“tourist test-level” this will, by definition, remove merchants’ incentive to promote card 
payments. The last stakeholders, the cardholders, will also be indifferent as they will not 
get  transparent price signals.  Their visible costs/charges for using cash or cards are 
identical.  The only difference cardholders might  experience is a possible convenience 
difference, ie ATM visits can be reduced by paying directly at shops. This situation can be 
described by following set of equations: 
          
Merchants become indifferent when MIF is set at tourist test level: 
 
  (15)                   B
m – C
m  – MIF
mOb = 0  
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Cardholders are indifferent, as they have the same fixed charge for POS and ATM usage,  
in which the benefits are embedded but invisible 
 
  (16)                C
c (B
c) = fixed   
 
Banks are indifferent when card and cash profit margins are equal, which implies that  
cash charges  levied on merchants  (C
m
cash)  must  cover  ATM costs  (ASF),  revenues 
comparable to point-of-sale MIFs  and cash acquiring costs (C
a
cash) over card acquiring 
costs  (C
a
card),  plus the cash share of common issuing costs  (allocated  on the basis  of 
volume shares v)  
 
  (17)    C
m




card ) + C
c (1-v) 
 
This level of merchant cash charges seems plausible in the current market setup, as cash 
acquirers need to cover their own costs; and since cardholders do not pay ASF costs these 
can only be charged to merchants (or via cross-subsidization from other services). The MIF 
component could be explained by the interests of both issuers and acquirers to level the 
profit margins among their products. When the dominant issuers are also acquirers they 
have an interest in setting cash service prices at this level, which will determine market 
pricing levels.  
 
The market is seldom in the perfect balance assumed above. If banks charge merchants less 
than cost for cash, this increases cross-subsidies to cash. If there is an imbalance between 
cash acquiring, the “long” cash banks (those with acquiring surplus) will gain benefits 
compared to the “short” banks, when most of the cash revenues stem from the acquiring 
side. The payment industry has also established different kinds of joint card acquiring 
companies, cash handling centers and ATM networks. These introduce monopoly entities 
into the process, which results in a common cost level for banks participating in these 
entities. This can therefore result in maintaining even more firmly the total development 
incentive removal situation, when costs/charges of given parts in the service chain can be 
fixed by service provider cooperation.    
 
This total removal of development incentives seems to be a basic cause for the slow 
development of payment services. Compared to other industries, competing service 
providers set prices at cost and are therefore  indifferent to customers’ choices, but 
customers will get price signals which guide them towards effective choices. 
    
5  Authority involvement in payment efficiency 
The payment industry seems, from competition viewpoint, to include the typical problems 
of network industries. Network externalities readily  result in one or a few dominant 
networks operating in limited competition. Interoperability requirements often  result in 
dominant standards which may become barriers to development. Dominant network 
operators can employ pricing strategies that support  their market position. Therefore                                                            
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authorities seem to take a greater interest in the pricing policies of card payment services 
and especially interchange fee issues, as these are a form of pricing cooperation among 
competing service providers.   
 The main issues for authorities in respect of interchange fees seem to be following: 
a.   An MIF maintaining positive incentives on both the issuing and acquiring side needs 
to be between MIF
c0b  and MIF
m0b. Which would be the optimal MIF from the 
competition perspective and how should it be determined?
      
b.   In a situation with limited competition, issuers might jointly decide on an MIF that 
will boost their profits. Should authorities therefore cap the size of MIFs in order to 
limit their profit effects and which would be the best means? 
c.   Four-party schemes employ explicit interchange fees while three party schemes can 
employ implicit pricing factors with effects resembling those of interchange fees.   
Is there a need for authorities to ensure a level-playing-field between 4-party and 3-
party schemes regarding interchange fee regulations and which would be the 
suitable means? 
d.  Current payment service pricing and interchange fee conventions are largely based on 
embedded and non-transparent pricing for end-users. To which extent would it be 
socially efficient, if authorities would enforce increased payment cost transparency 
and which would be suitable means for implementation? 
 
There seems to be a growing concern among authorities that the card industry has set 
MIFs too high or has at least not lowered them in line with cost developments and that they 
therefore have a profit boosting effect. There is a marked long-term downward trend in ICT 
costs, which have reduced card transaction processing costs.  Interest rates have been 
declining for many years in the large economies and credit risk analysis has improved. 
Increasing card transaction volumes also result in considerable economies of scale benefits 
due to a cost structure marked by a large share of fixed costs. The reduction in issuing cost 
(Ci) would advocate for a reduction in actual MIFs or an increase in rebates, in order to 
avoid a profit boosting effect in the card industry. Most of the parameters affecting MIF 
calculations are continuously changing and thus call for changes in MIFs and/or rebates. 
The authorities in many countries have discussed card fees and systems and MIF issues 
with the banks, eg Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, EU, Israel, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and US.
19
 
 Australia and EU 
have recently introduced specific interchange fee caps, and the US Federal Reserve has 
proposed, for public comment, a cap on debit card interchange fees. 
In Australia  the regulator (Reserve Bank of Australia) decided in 2006 to cap 
interchange fees based on issuers’ and acquirers’ costs. For credit cards, the main issuers 
were required to report on  their processing costs, fraud and fraud prevention costs, 
authorisation costs and credit costs for interest-free periods. The benchmark cap for credit 
                                                 
19 Bradford (2008)                                                            
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card interchange from acquirer to issuer was set to 0.50% based on the weighted average of 
reported costs. There have been two types of debit card schemes in Australia, a domestic 
EFTPOS (Electronic Fund Transfer at Point of Sale) system and an international scheme 
(Visa  and MasterCArd) system. For EFTPOS debit  ("domestic")  transactions, the 
interchange flow in Australia went originally in the opposite direction, that is, from issuers 
to acquirers, compared to the international debit interchange from acquirer to issuer. The 
RBA requested the main EFTPOS acquirers to report their processing and switching costs 
for these transactions,  and the lowest average costs will determine the interchange 
benchmark for EFTPOS transactions, which was set to AUD 0.05 per transaction in 2006. 
For the scheme debits ("international") the interchange fees were set at AUD 0.12 per 
transaction, on the basis of the main issuers’ average processing and authorisation costs. 
The EFTPOS debit transaction cap was realigned with the scheme debits as from the start 
of 2010, resulting in a change in the interchange flow direction and interchange size.  In 
summary, the Australian authority has employed a completely cost-based approach to cap 




 In the European Union DG Competition assessed MasterCard’s interchange fees in 
2007 and found the multilateral intra-EEA fallback interchange fee for cross-border 
payments to infringe the competition legislation and so will impose a penalty if MasterCard 
continues  to employ these.
21  In 2009 DG Competition and MasterCard settled on its 
undertaking to apply a weighted average cap of 0.30% for credit card MIF and 0.20% for 
debit card MIF, website publishing of MIFs, unblending and unbundling of merchant fees 
and services and permitting surcharging. DG Competition accepted the new calculation 
methodology of Mastercard, the  called “avoided-cost test” or “tourist test”. DG 
Competition also points out that an MIF must meet the conditions of Article 81(3) of the 
EC treaty, that is, “empirical proof that the MIF creates efficiencies that outweigh the 
restriction of competition, consumers get a fair share of those benefits, there are no less 
restrictive means of achieving the efficiencies and competition is not eliminated 
altogether.”  
22  DG-Competition makes MIF decisions  on a case-by-case basis and is 
continuing its antitrust proceedings against Visa Europe independently of MasterCard’s 
decisions.
23  In 2010, Visa and DG Competition settled on an average MIF for Debit 
transactions of 0.2%,  also based on the “tourist test” methodology.
24
 
  The European 
authority is thus content to cap at the level of the Tourist Test MIF.  
In the US the Dodd-Frank Act
25 requires that interchange fees be "reasonable and 
proportional to the costs incurred by the issuer". The Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System has therefore requested comments on a proposed new Regulation II, Debit 
Card  Interchange Fees and Routing.
26
                                                 
20 See RBA Standard of Wholesale (‘Interchange’) Fees in designated Credit Card Systems and RBA Credit 
Card Benchmark Calculation. RBA (2006a, 2006b, 2006c and 2009) 
  The proposal includes two alternatives for 
interchange fee capping: 1) a safe harbor amount of USD 0.07 per transaction or 2) a cost 
21 Commission Decision of 19 December 2007, COMP/34.579 MasterCard 
22 Press release Memo/09/143 1 April 2009 
23 Schwimann (2009) p. 244 and 247-248 
24 Visa Press release 26 April 2010, www.visaeurope.com/en/newsroom/news/articles/2010/ 
25 Publ. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) 
26 Regulation II; Docket No. R-1404 RIN No 7100-AD63                                                            
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based on actual issuing costs up to USD 0.12 per transaction. Any MIF below the safe 
harbor cap would be acceptable as such. For any MIF above the safe harbor cap, the issuers 
would have to provide cost information to support an MIF between the safe harbor and the 
absolute MIF cap. The Fed's approach also incorporates profit limiting, ie the selected MIF 
must be supported by cost information in order to avoid a profit boosting effect. The Fed 
has also used a flat transaction-based fee approach, which is closer to the actual processing 
cost structure than an ad valorem MIF. Providing two alternatives introduces an interesting 
flexibility factor from the industry point of view, as it enables the industry to introduce an 
MIF-level within certain limits based on costs. This proposal covers only debit card 
interchange fees.    
 
These authorities have decided to cap the MIFs based on two quite different bases. The 
Australian and US policies focus on issuing costs in order to ensure that MIFs are not used 
to boost issuing profits, while the European focus is only on ensuring that sufficient 
merchant interest remains. The difference between these approaches can be written as 
 
      (18)           Regulatory difference = MIF
m0b – C
c   =  ∏
i
    (with no rebate difference) 
 
The Australian and US versions will result in a lower MIF due to the cost-based cap. If 
there were differences in the rebates, these should be included in the equations, but for 
debit cards rebates are generally zero, and the credit card service costs are included in Ci. 
This would point to European competition authorities accepting extra profit margins in 
their MIF implementation policy.  Another interesting difference in the regulatory outcome 
is that the costs included in the Australian debit card MIF calculations are quite limited, 
which results in a flat per transaction based MIF cap. The US cap also requires a flat fee. 
The European stance is based on merchant benefits and results in a value based debit card 
MIF cap. The value-based MIF will imply a cross-subsidisation compared to costs between 
small and large debit card payments. A value-based MIF will penalise large debit card 
payments and subsidise small value payments.  A summary of the differences in MIF-levels 
and transferred MIFs in these alternatives can be found in table 2.  
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Number  Value Ave size per trans. per value total Trans./yearValue/year
(billions) (billions) % (millions) per inhab. per inhab.
Australia            (AUD) 1.7 110 65 0.12 0.19 204 79 5 116
                               (EUR rate 1.7) 65 38 0.07 120 3010
EU 16 (for FR all trans.  22 1160 53 0.11 0.20 2 320 56 2 937
categorised as debit) 1160 53 0.11 2320 2937
US safe harbor (USD) 34 1340 39 0.07 0.18 2 380 112 4 406
                               (EUR rate 1.3) 1031 30 0.05 1831 3390
US max cap        (USD) 34 1340 39 0.12 0.30 4 080 112 4 406
                                                (EUR)   0.09 3138 3390
Transactions 2008 Interchange fees Debit card usage
 
 




Although the Australian and US flat MIFs have been set separately, these are quite close to 
each other, with the Australian as an average of the US proposal (based on the selected 
exchange rates). The European value-based MIF limit will result in a higher calculated 
average fee (EUR 0.11) than the Australian and US fees, based on current volumes. In a per 
value comparison, all MIF limits are very close to each other except for the US max cap, 
which is clearly higher. Because the card market sizes do not differ widely for the US Safe 
Harbor and EU16, the interchange fee totals are not far apart. This is partly due to the 
average card transaction size being clearly higher in EU16. The card usage in value per 
capita does not differ greatlyacross the regions, but the number of transactions is clearly 
less in EU16, due to higher average size of transactions.     
Although the regulating authorities have applied different arguments, the overall stance 
seems to be that MIF limitations are currently set according to issuers' cost levels, in order 
to limit possibilities for profit boosting. However, from the competition point of view, 
there is another interesting MIF level, that is, the zero-level. With MIFs set to zero, the 
acquiring side will set charges independently of the issuing side and card transactions 
would therefore be processed at par in the payment networks. At-par acquiring would 
create  pressure  for  more  transparent cardholder pricing and would  reduce cross-
subsidisation effects. Issuers often warn that cutting MIFs would result in higher card fees 
and therefore in less  use of cards and more  use of cash. However, the outcome will 
probably be the opposite, because if banks would promote the use of cash it would increase 
their overall costs due to more expensive cash distribution. Compared to any other MIF 
value, the zero value has the advantage of simplicity. It will not require any interservice 
provider invoicing or analyses/debates on the exact calculation rules for the MIFs.  It would 
completely remove issuers' profit boosting possibilities  and a large part of the cross-
subsidisation possibility on the issuing side.  
                                                 
27 Table 2 contain data from 2008 as 2009 figures are not yet available from all regions. The volumes have 
most probably grown in all countries resulting in higher calculative MIF totals. The EU-16 figures are derived 
by assuming that all French debit and deferred debit transactions are from MIF point of view under the debit 
MIF scheme (in France the acquiring process is the same for immediate and deferred debit and payment 
extension time is short. In order to compare values in different currencies exchange rates of 1.7 EUR/AUD 
and 1.3 EUR/USD is used.  
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6  Concluding remarks 
Competition has been one of the main drivers for improved efficiency and development in 
most industries. However, in the payment industry in particular price competition seems 
almost completely absent in the current market setup, and one could even say that the 
existing limited price structures are often anti-competitive. Efficiency and development 
would require more price competition among issuers, acquirers, network providers and 
instruments. A situation with almost complete removal of development incentives will 
postpone the achievable social benefits of more efficient payment technology.   
A non-transparent MIF embedded in products and services purchased by consumers 
will, in the case of zero direct rebates to cardholders, mean extra profits for issuers or 
cross-subsidies to cash payers in payment situations where cards are more cost efficient 
than cash (that is in most payment situations  beyond a low initial threshold of a few euros). 
In markets  with sufficient competition,  the  cost reductions experienced by issuers, 
acquirers and merchants would be channelled to customers showing a clear cost difference, 
thus inducing cardholders to choose between ATMs and EFTPOS terminals according to 
their preferences, including the economic difference.  In order to promote efficiency in the 
payments  market authorities need to open the market to  increased competition, which 
would imply requiring open access to payment networks and interoperable standards from 
the processing technical point of view.  
Regulating MIFs downwards will increase competition between payment instruments 
and reduce cross-subsidisation between cash and cards as well as reduce issuers' 
possibilities to extract extra profits from the acquiring side. Reducing MIFs to exactly zero 
would provide increased simplicity in card processing and reduce both profit boosting and 
cross-subsidisation possibilities/interest. It would be in  line  with  the norm for other 
instruments
28
The payment industry has largely eliminated the development incentives for cards by 
maintaining high interchange fees, which result in a too little use of cards compared to their 
relative cost efficiency in relation to other older instruments, cash and cheques. Authorities 
have started to intervene, which seems to be necessary in order to speed up developments 
in payments and provide benefits to the whole economy. The two-sided market model is 
based on non-transparency and cross-subsidisation, which distort the price/cost information 
visible to cardholders and merchants. The resent authority interventions in card markets, 
setting ceilings on MIFs and abolishing no-surcharge rules, have been aimed at increasing 
price transparency and thereby price competition. It seems difficult  –  from  both  the 
theoretical and empirical viewpoints  –  to defend increased and prolonged cross-
subsidisation given the goal of more efficient resource allocation in payments or in any 
other markets.  
 on most markets and end the discussions on how to establish a given MIF 
level.  
    
                                                 
28 For example the at-par check redemption in US and credit transfer and direct debit exchange using  the 
"share" option in EU after 2012.                                                              
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Appendix 
Credit cards versus cash and debit cards 
 
 
A credit card is a bundled product with payment service and credit service. Debit and credit 
cards are identical as to payment features: technically similar cards, same kinds of 
terminals, and same types of acquiring and issuing processing. Card purchases are debited 
from the cardholder’s account and credited to the merchant. From the transaction-
processing viewpoint, debit and credit cards are alike and independent of whether the card 
account is on the debit or credit side. Today the same physical card often refers to two 
different accounts, using co-branding techniques, where the cardholder selects at point of 
sale the applicable account for each payment (see below for details). 
The main difference regarding the credit facility relates to the payer of the credit costs. 
When a card customer uses a debit card with overdraft facility or a pure revolving credit 
card, he pays the credit cost, which does not affect the MIF or merchant fee. When a credit 
card purchase carries an interest-free credit period, typically one month, for the cardholder, 
who is covered by higher interchange fees/merchant fees
29
In a non-surcharging setup, debit cards always cross-subsidise credit cards with delayed 
debit, because the payment function and payment costs are identical, so some of the credit 
costs will be transferred to debit card users. In a cash versus credit comparison, the result 
will depend on the levels of credit and cash costs. Credit cards with high MIF/merchant fee 
will in most cases be cross-subsidised by cash users, which partly explains the reluctance 
of low-margin merchants to accept such cards, as price-increasing extra services would 
result in higher prices compared to other non-accepting competitors. In the opposite case, 
where merchants’ cash costs are higher than credit costs’ for low-cost credit cards, the cash 
payers will benefit from cross-subsidising. 
, the credit costs will be 
embedded in the merchant’s consumer price (via a higher MIF) and cross-subsidised by 
those who do not use credit. Such cards are often termed cards with the delayed debit 
function. The difference in who bears the costs is apparent when two identical purchases 
are compared: one where the credit card with a delayed debit function is used directly in a 
non-surcharging shop for payment and one where the cardholder first goes to an ATM to 
withdraw cash from a credit card account and then uses the cash at the merchant. In the 
first case, the credit/delayed costs are shared by all merchant customers, due to the higher 
credit card MIF, and in the later case the cardholder will pay an explicit transparent higher 
ATM withdrawal fee (often partly ad valorem and partly fixed) that covers the credit costs. 
One point often raised about MIFs for credit cards with delayed debit option is that 
merchants will be able to sell more because customers can spend on credit. However, this 
is only true if the average consumer credit level continuously rises and for each period it 
would only apply to the increases. Each purchase this month will result in an equal 
decrease in purchasing power the next month when the delayed debit for the credit card bill 
falls due, so the credit card with delayed debit can at best merely bring forward the 
purchase by one month on average.  
                                                 
29 Credit cards typically carry higher merchant fees and MIFs than debit cards. See Weiner&Writhgt (2005) 
and European Commission DG Competition decision on MasterCard and Visa interchange fees.                                                            
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In the  European card payment statistics, card payments are categorised as debit card 
payments, credit card payments, or a category that includes deferred debit/credit 
transactions. Figures 5a, 5b and 5c show the developments in these groups in Europe 































Figure 5a: Debit card purchases as share of private consumption  
Debit card purchases are clearly more popular than deferred debit/credit or credit card 
purchases. In the top countries they accounted for more than 30% of total private 
consumption in 2009 and the average was about 16% of consumption. The average yearly 
growth in consumption share over the period studied was 7.4%. The differences between 
the countries are strikingly large. 
 
                                                 
30 The origin of the statistical data is the Statistical Data Warehouse of ECB (Blue Book). Not all countries 
were included due to lack of data or changes in the data categorization during the period. The statistics 
comprise mainly bank-based data, and eg different kinds of merchant-chain credit cards etc are not included 
in the data. As reporting in some of the countries began only in the middle of the analyzed period, their 
impact on growth calculations is limited to the latter part of the period.                                                            
 





























Figure 5b: Credit card purchases as share of private consumption  
Credit card
31
                                                 
31 The credit cards included in these statistics (issued by banks) are such that the cardholder pays the interest 
on the credit. Credit cards issued by merchants, chain store etc are not included, as information on merchant 
fees and possible MIFs is not available.  
  purchases using cards provided by banks are especially popular in three 
countries (IE, LU and UK, where they accounted for 10–15% of total private consumption 
in 2009, compared to the figures for the other countries, which are all below 5%. The 
average share is about 3% of consumption. The average growth over the period studied was 
5.1%.                                                            
 




























 Figure 5c: Deferred debit and credit card purchases as share of private consumption  
The share of private consumption via deferred debit/credit
32
Debit card purchases clearly dominate all types of credit purchases, and their share of 
private consumption is increasing more rapidly. The difference in developments between 
interest-free deferred credit/debit and interest-bearing credit purchases is considerable 
small. Based on the statistics, neither form of credit seems to be a driving force for moving 
from cash to card payments.  
 purchases does not exceed 
10% in any country, and the average is about 4%. The yearly growth in share of private 
consumption has been 6.8%.   
The yearly growth in the consumption share corresponds to a monthly rate of 0.5%. The 
cost of this growth (assuming it is due to free credit) can be viewed as the MIF difference 
between debit and deferred credit/debit, ie 0.1%, in the future in Europe. It has usually been 
larger in the past. However, this added MIF fee has to be paid every month for the total 
deferred credit/debit volume in order to revolve the credit. In order for the extra sales of 
0.5% to have a general price-reducing effect and thereby result in consumer benefits, the 
merchant margins need to be quite wide. The positive effect depends also on the extent to 
which the interest-free credit usage has resulted in real growth and the extent to which it 
has replaced cash payments or debit card payments, eg via multi-homing (see next section).  
 
                                                 
32 A deferred debit/credit card is defined as a card that includes a free interest period (typically one month) 
before the credit has to be settled or moves to revolving credit, for which the cardholder pays interest for 
additional credit periods.                                                            
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Multi-homing has been used to describe a situation in which the cardholder can 
optionally use several cards or payment instruments. It is usually assumed that the payer 
selects his most advantageous option. Based on SEPA developments, multi-homing will 
increase in the form of built-in dual function cards (co-branded cards) that include in the 
same card links to two different card accounts – a debit account and a credit account 
(probably in most cases delayed debit/credit). The cardholder can at point of sale select the 
account. The cardholder’s choice then determines the merchant fee for to the purchase, 
debit or credit card fee, and the MIF.  
Combining two previously physically separate cards into a single card and separating 
the logical difference by a key-stroke decision at the point-of-sale-terminal makes multi-
homing easier for customers.
33
In the current business model setup, without surcharging, such built-in multi-homing 
will hide the cost difference on the acquiring side from the cardholders and will only show 
the delayed debit and other benefits on the issuer side (versus the other function on the 
same card). Individual cardholders in such a setup have an interest in being cross-
subsidised by other payers.  
  These promote banks’ interests in increased credit card 
usage covered by a higher MIF. 
Changing from current cards to built-in multi-homing cards would reduce the costs of 
physical cards, but this likely has very little impact on the overall use of cards. Card 
transactions will be booked on different accounts under different MIFs and service rules. 
The effect on the total use of cards and cash will be largely unaffected, but cardholders will 
be induced to select the credit options, because of the seemingly free credit option.  
 
                                                 
33 Banks at least in Finland have parameterised the credit card option as the default selection, ie cardholders 
have to make an extra key stroke in order to select the debit card payment and thereby the low MIF and low 
merchant fee option.  
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